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The fertility declines associated with the final phase of the global demographic transition have 
led to slower population growth and accelerated ageing in developed countries and in several 
advanced developing countries. A global demographic and economic is used to assess the 
implications of these changes for population sizes, age-gender distributions, labour force 
growth and their implications for economic performance. A base line projection that 
incorporates declining fertility is compared with a hypothetical constant population growth 
scenario. The results show that slower population growth and ageing reduces average saving 
rates in industrial regions, yet global investment demand is also slowed and saving rates rise 
in developing regions, so there is no net tightening of financial markets. Increased aged labour 
force participation, considered one solution to the resulting rise in aged dependency in 
advanced regions, is found to redistribute investment in favour of the industrialised regions 
and hence to accelerate their per capita income growth, while conferring on the other regions 
compensatory terms of trade improvements. The alternative of replacement migration is found 
to require inconceivably large population movements. It also impairs real per capita growth in 





Recent changes in global demographic behaviour, including fertility, mortality and 
migration, have been sharper than had been anticipated in recent decades.  In most countries, 
consistent with the central phase of the global demographic transition, infant mortality fell 
through the course of the last century and adult life expectancy increased, causing a surge of 
population growth.
1  The declines in birth rates anticipated as part of the final phase of this 
transition have been sudden, first in developed countries and recently in many developing 
countries.
2  Before this century is half over, populations in Japan and some European 
countries are likely to be smaller than they were in 1990, with these declines in total 
populations being preceded by declines in the number and proportion of people of working 
age.
3
We examine the economic implications of these changes to population sizes and 
structures using a complete demographic model that is constructed for integration with a 
                                                      
1 The demographic transition refers to that from combined high birth and death rates prior to development 
through a phase in which death rates decline due to public health innovations and, finally, to one in which birth 
rates also decline.  The rates of population growth are low in both the initial and final phases but high in the 
interim.  A clear explanation of this pattern is offered by Bloom and Williamson (1998). 
2 IMF (2004: Chapter 3), Lee (2003), Duncan and Wilson (2004). 
3 Bryant and McKibbin (1998), United Nations (2003). 
 2dynamic model of the global economy.  The latter model is a development of GTAP-
Dynamic, the standard version of which has single households in each region and therefore no 
demographic structure.
4  The new version has regional households that are disaggregated by 
age group and gender.  Compared with other studies of global demographic change, the 
explicit incorporation of a demographic sub-model facilitates not only the conventional 
analysis of changes in fertility and life expectancy but also of changes in labour force 
participation and migration.  And these are increasingly important.  Indeed, for the 
industrialised economies, during this and subsequent decades total populations and labour 
forces will be more substantially influenced by labour force participation rates and migration 
flows than by natural population increases.
5  In countries where demographic changes will 
soon yield declining labour forces, there will be pressure to substantially raise guest worker 
and net immigration rates.
6  This new wave of “replacement” migration flows will have 
important implications for economic structure in regions of both origin and destination. 
Our analysis offers a base line projection through 2030 that incorporates the final 
phase of the global demographic transition.  Consistent with earlier forecasts, not only are 
populations and labour forces projected to decline in Europe and Japan, but the simulations 
also show this to occur in China within the coming decade.  Moreover, where populations are 
to decline, labour forces will decline sooner and faster.  This base line projection is then 
compared with a hypothetical one in which regional populations grow at constant rates and 
their age-gender compositions remain unchanged.  This comparison draws out the effects of 
the fertility slow-down and the ageing of regional populations.  We then consider the effects 
of alternative policy responses to the associated rise in aged dependency ratios in the major 
industrial regions.  First, we examine a scenario in which governments raise retirement ages 
and, thereby, increase aged labour force participation rates.  Second, we assume the 
governments take advantage of the relative youth of immigrants by adopting “replacement” 
migration policies. 
Section 2 offers a brief overview of the demographic sub-model and economic model 
used.  A description of the base line projection to 2030, and of its construction, is then 
provided in Section 3.  In Section 4, a hypothetical “balanced population growth” scenario is 
                                                      
4 The GTAP-Dynamic model is a development of its comparative static progenitor, GTAP (Hertel et al. 1997).  
Its dynamics is described by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000).  Earlier applications of the standard model to 
the issues raised in this paper is that by Shi and Tyers (2004) and Duncan, Shi and Tyers (2005). 
5 For a summary of the impact of migration for all advanced economies, see IMF 2004: Figure 3.2.  For 
Australia, net immigration contributes substantially to overall population growth and is likely to do so to an 
increasing extent (Khoo and McDonald 2002, 2003). 
6 See United Nations (2000) for a treatment of replacement migration in Europe.  Further discussion of the 
European case is offered by Tani (2003) and Hatton and Tani (2003). 
 3constructed and compared with the base line projection, so as to distinguish the effects of 
embodied ageing and population slow-downs.  Then, in Section 5, we look at the impact of 
some policy responses to population ageing and labour force decline.  The base line is 
compared with scenarios in which aged dependency in the older industrial economies is 
constrained first by increased aged labour force participation and, second, by expanded 
immigration.  Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. MODELLING DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ITS ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
The construction of a full demographic sub-model on 14 regions avoids reliance on a 
fixed set of population projections.
7  As is clear from Bongaarts, J. and R.A. Bulatao (2000) 
and from the stochastic bounds presented by Duncan and Wilson (2004), previous forecasts 
have routinely over-projected future population growth and hence they have underestimated 
the implications of slowing growth and ageing.  Yet, complete incorporation of demographic 
behaviour within a global economic model requires some loss of detail.  The demographic 
sub-model offered here tracks populations in four age groups: the dependent young, adults of 
fertile and working age, older working adults and the mostly-retired over 60s, and two 
genders; a total of eight age-gender groups.  The 14 regions are chosen so as to single out 
countries that are populous or groups of countries of particular demographic and economic 
interest (Table 1).
8  The sub-model is described first and then this section turns to the global 
economic model to which it is attached. 
 
a. The Demographic Sub-Model 
Each age-gender group is a homogeneous sub-population with group-specific death 
and migration rates.  The final age group (60+) has duration equal to measured life 
expectancy at 60, which varies across genders and regions.  The model represents full 
matrices of migration flows between the 14 regions, for each age and gender group.  In 
projections where migration policies are assumed to remain unchanged, each of these flows 
depends on a fixed migration rate, defined on the population of the destination age-gender 
group and region.
9  The key parameters, then, are regional birth rates and sex ratios at birth, 
                                                      
7 Many studies use the standard projections by the United Nations Population Division (2003). 
8 The demographic sub-model has been used in stand alone mode for the analysis of trends in labour forces and 
aged dependency ratios.  For a more complete documentation, see Chan and Tyers (2006) and Tyers et al. 
(2005). 
9 Migration flows are therefore driven by population growth in the destination region.  One rationale for this 
strong assumption is that countries are better able to cope with migrants’ adjustment costs when flows are kept to 
particular fractions of indigenous populations.  There is, however, evidence that migration flows can be inversely 
 4age and gender specific death, immigration and emigration rates and life expectancies at 60.  
The migration rates are based on recent migration records.
10  The birth rates, life expectancy 
at 60 and the age and gender specific mortality rates all trend through time asymptotically.  
For each age-gender group, and region, a target rate is identified.  These tend to be levels 
observed in advanced regions, toward which other regions might be expected to converge.  
The parameters then approach these target rates with initial growth rates determined by 
historical observation. 
One of the important consequences of population ageing is its negative impact on the 
labour force size.  To capture this, the number of “full-time equivalent” workers is estimated.  
First, labour force participation rates, by gender and age group, are assembled for each region, 
from ILO statistics on the “economically active population”.  The proportion of workers that 
are part time and the hours they work relative to each regional standard for full time work are 
then accounted for from regional sources.
11  The age and gender specific rates of participation 
and part-time work are then applied to populations in each age and gender group to derive the 
numbers of full time equivalent workers.  With these in hand, a range of dependency ratios 
can be defined.  That used here is the “non-working aged” dependency ratio, which is the 
number of non-working persons over 60 per full time equivalent worker. 
The regional levels and age structures of the base line population projections are 
summarised in Table 2.  The totals accord closely with corresponding United Nations 
projections, notwithstanding our simple, four-age-group model.
12  Corresponding base line 
projections of labour force levels and age structures are summarised in Table 3, showing 
substantial ageing of labour forces in all regions and declines in labour force levels in Western 
and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union and Japan.  The widespread ageing of 
populations is especially clear from the trends in non-working aged dependency ratios listed 
in Table 4.  Finally, base line projections of total populations and labour forces for a selection 
of regions are displayed in Figure 1. This figure draws attention to the contrasts between 
regions with growing and contacting populations and labour forces and, for individual 
                                                                                                                                                                      
proportional to indigenous population growth, driven, for example, by the need to maintain labour forces in the 
face of declining rates of natural increase.  More sophisticated migration behaviour has been incorporated in an 
extended version of this model, as represented in Tyers et al. (2006). 
10 Records of gross migration flows are weak at best in most countries.  The matrices are constructed from 
detailed records available from Australia, Western Europe and North America, combined with immigrant stock 
matrices constructed by Parsons et al. (2005), as described in Vedi (2005) and Tyers et al. (2006). 
11 For sources, see Chan and Tyers (2006).  In projecting participation and part-time work rates, as for birth and 
death rates, they are assumed to trend through time asymptotically toward a target, with the rate of approach 
determined by the initial rate of change.  Target rates are chosen from countries considered “advanced” in terms 
of labour force behaviour. 
12 See United Nations (2003) and the detailed comparison provided in Chan and Tyers (2006). 
 5regions, between the trends in populations and labour forces.  Contracting populations and 
labour forces are prominent and important, contrasting with the world view of mid to late 20th 
century.  Moreover, the old practice of assuming constant labour force participation, and 
hence that populations and labour forces grow at the same rates, is shown to create substantial 
errors when demographic change is taking place.  Where populations are declining they are 
also ageing and this causes their labour forces to decline even faster.  The opposite is true 
when populations are growing rapidly. 
 
b. Extensions to the GTAP-Dynamic Model 
To capture the economic consequences of the projected demographic changes we 
adapt the now standard GTAP-Dynamic long-term dynamic model of the world economy 
(Ianchovichina and McDougall, 2000).  It is based on the widely-used GTAP Database, which 
permits a very high level of country and commodity detail.  We use the 14 regions indicated 
in Appendix 1 and, because our focus is not sectoral, products and services are aggregated 
into just three groups: food (including processed foods), industrial goods (mining and 
manufacturing) and services.  These product groups are differentiated by region of origin, so 
that the “food” produced in Australia is not the same as that produced in other regions.  
Consumers substitute imperfectly between regional food aggregates as they do between food, 
industrial products and services.  As in other dynamic models of the global economy, in 
GTAP-Dynamic the endogenous component of simulated economic growth is physical capital 
accumulation.  Technical change is introduced in the form of exogenous trends.  One 
important consequence of this is that the model exhibits the property of all dynamic models of 
the Solow-Swan type, namely that a slowdown in population growth also slows GDP growth 
but raises the time path of per capita income (see Chapter 4 in Pitchford, 1974). 
Compared with other economy-wide models, the standard version of GTAP-Dynamic 
has a number of idiosyncrasies, on some of which improvement has been required.  First, it 
has recursive multi-regional dynamics in which investment, and its distribution across 
regions, is driven by adaptive expectations about capital returns.
13  This approach is suited to 
the long term analysis of demographic change, so we have retained it.  Second, the base 
period equilibrium is not usually a steady state and there are no restrictions on the steady 
                                                      
13 This is unlike the McKibbin models, for example, since they offer roles for agents with perfect foresight.  See 
Bryant, R.C. and W.J. McKibbin (1998, 2001). 
 6states ultimately reached following shocks.
14  We have not found this property to cause any 
aberrant behaviour and so have retained it, also.  Third, the process of physical capital 
accumulation is region-wide and not sector-specific.  This requires the assumption that 
physical capital is perfectly mobile between industries in the very short run.
15  Again, while 
this could be problematic for short run analysis, the long run nature of demographic change 
renders it unimportant here.  Finally, rates of saving from regional incomes are fixed, as are 
government shares of expenditure.  This property of the standard model is problematic for 
demographic analysis, since the ageing of populations raises the proportion of retirees and 
reduces the average saving rate.  Our adaptation alters this behaviour substantially. 
  The most substantial alteration is to sub-divide each regional household into eight age-
gender groups, in parallel with the demographic sub-model.  In the adaptation of GTAP-
Dynamic, these eight age-gender groups differ in their consumption preferences, saving rates, 
labour supply and skill composition.  Regional income is divided between government 
consumption and total private disposable income.  Private disposable income is then split 
between the eight age-gender groups in a manner informed by empirical studies of age and 
gender specific consumption behaviour.  For each age-gender group we then use a Keynesian 
consumption equation to split disposable income between saving and consumption 
expenditure.
16  Group private saving rates then become endogenous, depending on real 
disposable income and the real interest rate.  Once group consumption expenditures are 
known, the standard GTAP CDE
17 consumption preferences are applied to each, with 
preference parameters varying to reflect age-gender differences in tastes.  These modifications 




                                                      
14 All regions have open capital accounts so that all inter-regional payments always balance.  When a region’s 
savings falls relative to its investment the gap between them is financed by foreign savings.  If this happens over 
a sustained period the region’s current account deficit can “blow out”, implying that foreign claims on a region’s 
domestic assets become large in relation to regional income. 
15 Most global dynamic models make this assumption.  An exception at the regional level is Australia’s 
MONASH model (Dixon and Rimmer 2002).  This model has very substantial sectoral detail and physical 
capital accumulation is sector-specific.  As yet, this behaviour has not been given global scope. 
16 This is an empirically based reduced form approach to the underlying intertemporal optimization problem 
solved by individuals in each group. 
17 This refers to the “constant difference of elasticities of substitution” demand system, which offers a practical 
approach to allowing non-homotheticity of preferences in large models.  See Hertel et al. (1997). 
18 Direct taxation is not represented in the model and so government deficits are not endogenous.  The 
distortionary effects of fiscal policy responses to ageing are therefore not considered in this paper.  Their 
representation would not only require the incorporation of direct tax regimes but also the splitting of services so 
as to capture age-related demand (education, health and aged care, for example).  While these changes are 
possible, they are not essential to the analysis of aggregate economic performance offered in this paper. 
 73. THE BASE LINE SCENARIO 
The demographic module and the modified version of GTAP-Dynamic are used in 
combination to construct a total of four projections through 2030.  The central projection is 
labelled the base line.  It is designed as a “business as usual” projection, to serve as a 
reference when changes in demographic behaviour are introduced.  It embodies all the future 
demographic change that is built into base period regional age distributions and exogenous 
trends in birth, death and migration rates.  Importantly, however, all the further projections to 
be discussed differ from the base line in their demographic and labour force participation 
behaviour.  All therefore have in common a number of assumptions about economic 
behaviour and the exogenous determinants of economic growth.  Most important amongst 
these are the variation across regions of exogenous factor productivity growth and investment 
risk premia. 
 
a. Exogenous Factor Productivity Growth 
The base line scenario is particularly sensitive to assumptions about the exogenous 
sources of growth.  They enter the model as factor productivity growth shocks, applied 
separately for each of the five factors of production.
19  The higher these are for a particular 
region, the larger is that region’s marginal product of capital.  The region therefore enjoys 
higher levels of investment and hence a double boost to its per capita income growth rate.  
Yet the empirical literature is inconsistent about productivity growth across sectors.  
Ianchovichina et al. (2001) conclude from their own survey that productivity growth is 
generally faster in agriculture than in other sectors.  This is credible, particularly in rapidly 
growing developing countries where the agricultural workforce is declining, often rapidly, 
while agricultural output continues to grow (Ruttan 2002).  More recent empirical studies 
focusing on advanced countries, such as those by the Productivity Commission (1999) and 
Stiroh (2001), suggest the opposite, however.  Since the early 1990s, productivity growth in 
the advanced regions appears to have been slower in agriculture than in manufacturing and 
services. 
The factor productivity growth rates assumed in all scenarios are drawn from a survey 
of recent empirical literature (Tyers et al. 2005).  While our factor-specific rendering is only 
partially supported by this literature it offers a more complete characterisation of productivity 
growth and the potential for further experimentation with technology in the future.  
                                                      
19 These are the standard primary factors from the GTAP global database: land, natural resources, physical 
capital, production (unskilled) labour and professional (skilled) labour. 
 8Agricultural productivity grows more rapidly than that in the other sectors in Australia, China, 
Indonesia, Other East Asia, India and Other South Asia.  In Australia, this is assumed to be 
due to increasing land productivity, while in the other regions it is due to increased labour 
productivity in agriculture and the associated shedding of labour to the other sectors.  In the 
other industrialised regions, the process of labour relocation has slowed down and labour 
productivity growth is slower in agriculture.  In the other developing regions, the relocation of 
workers from agriculture has tended not to be so rapid even in the poorest of these regions. 
 
b. Investment Risk Premia 
Aside from exogenous productivity growth, a key aspect of the base line projection is 
the allocation of investment across regions.  The standard GTAP-Dynamic model takes no 
explicit account of interest premia associated with financial market immaturity and 
incompleteness or risk and so tends to allocate investment to regions that have the strongest 
growth in marginal products of physical capital.  These tend to be the labour-abundant 
developing countries whose labour forces are still expanding rapidly.  It finds Africa and 
Indonesia attractive prospects for this reason, yet we know that risk considerations limit the 
flow of foreign investment into these regions and that these are likely to remain important in 
the future.  To account for this we have constructed a “pre-base line” simulation in which we 
maintain the relative growth rates of investment across regions.  In this simulation, global 
investment rises and falls but its allocation between regions is thus controlled.  To do this a 
risk premium variable (the GTAP Dynamic variable SDRORT) is made endogenous.  This 
creates wedges between the international and regional interest rates.  These interest premia are 
high for the populous developing regions of Indonesia, India, South America and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  They tend to fall over time in other regions, where labour forces are falling 
or growing more slowly, most prominently in China.  The Chinese interest premium decline 
may be feasible, however, as a consequence of on-going financial reforms.
20
The final base line simulation then frees up investment, but maintains the time paths 
of the regional interest premia as exogenous.  As with the exogenous technical change 
represented by factor productivity growth rates, these premia are then held constant in all 
                                                      
20 Maintaining investment growth in China despite the eventual decline in its labour force requires a substantial 
decline in China’s interest rate relative to that paid in, say, North America.  If this decline is beyond that 
achievable through financial reforms, our base line investment in China, and therefore China’s projected 
economic growth rate, may be over-estimated.  For more work on the implications for the Chinese economy, see 
Tyers and Golley (2006). 
 9subsequent simulations.  No allowance is therefore made for feedback between demographic 
change and either factor productivity or investment premia. 
 
c. The Projection 
Overall base line economic performance is suggested by Table 5, which lists the 
projected increments to regional real per capita incomes by 2030.  In part because of its 
comparatively young population and hence its continuing rapid labour force growth, India 
attracts substantial new investment and is projected to take over from China as the world’s 
most rapidly expanding region.  This investment, combined with exogenous factor 
productivity growth, ensures that India is also projected to deliver the largest improvement in 
real per capita income through 2030.  China’s growth is slower in aggregate, because of its 
declining labour force, but its declining interest premium maintains a high level of investment 
growth sufficient to deliver the second largest proportional increase in real per capita income.  
Indonesia and “other East Asia” are also strong performers, while the older industrial 
economies continue to grow more slowly.  The African and Middle Eastern regions enjoy 
good GDP growth performance but their high population growth rates limit their performance 
in per capita terms. 
Slower population growth and ageing, through their effects on the supply of skilled 
and unskilled labour, alter regional patterns of comparative advantage and hence of trade.  As 
labour forces decline in the older industrial regions (Figure 1), the shares of manufactures in 
their exports fall, especially in North America and Western Europe.  In North America, this is 
accompanied by an increase in export share of agriculture, which is intensive in land and 
capital compared with manufacturing, while in Western Europe it is associated with an 
increased export share of services, which are capital intensive.  The projected trend of 
international prices shows stable manufacturing and service prices but, relative to these, food 
product prices rise by about 15 per cent over the three decades.
21
  Among the major developing regions, India’s rapidly expanding population, and 
especially the growth of its unskilled labour supply, drives the export share of its heavily 
labour-intensive food industry from 16 to 33 per cent by 2030.  In the meantime, the share of 
industrial products falls from about two thirds to roughly half.  The slow down and eventual 
                                                      
21 Rising relative food prices appear to depart from the perspective of Lewis (1952) and Grilli and Yang (1988) 
which envisions declining raw commodity prices and consequent deterioration in the terms of trade of the 
world’s poorest regions.  When adjustments were made by Lipsey (1994) for changes in the quality of 
manufactures and the expansion in the consumer services provided by manufactured products, raw commodity 
prices are seen to be rising through time. 
 10decline in China’s population (Figure 1) is projected to reduce its unskilled labour force, 
while its supply of skilled labour continues to grow.  Industrial products therefore continue to 
dominate China’s exports with the share of relatively labour intensive food and agricultural 
products declining slightly. 
 
4. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BASE LINE AGEING 
The base line demographic and economic projections embody the continuation of the 
observed population slow-downs and ageing.  They are subsequently to be compared with two 
alternative scenarios that are distinguished by changes in labour force regulation and 
migration policy.  Before turning to these alternative scenarios, however, the effects of the 
ageing embodied in the base line are quantified by comparing it with a hypothetical 
“comparator” scenario in which the population growth and age distributions are held constant. 
 
a. The Comparator Scenario 
Most of the population ageing that appears in the base line through 2030 is already built in 
to the base year (1997) demographic structure, in the form of age-gender distributions and 
birth and death rates.  Our hypothetical “comparator” scenario has the following properties. 
o  For each region, the populations of age-gender groups grow from 1997 at the annual 
rates recorded for the total regional population in that year 
o  Because all population groups within any region grow through time at the same rates, 
there are no changes in age distributions and therefore no age-driven changes in 
average saving rates, labour force participation or consumption 
o  Labour force participation rates are held constant so that, in each region, the labour 
force also grows at the population growth rate. 
The annual growth rates used, and the 2030 regional populations in both the comparator and 
the base line projections are listed in Table 6.  Note that, in the context of the range of 
stochastic projections of the global population reviewed by Duncan and Wilson (2004), the 
comparator scenario is high though within the 95 per cent confidence interval range, while the 
base line is very near the mean projection. 
 
b. The Effects of the Ageing and Population Growth Slow-downs 
Relative to the comparator projection, the base line embodies fertility declines and 
ageing in all, and slower population growth in almost all, regions.  Since age distributions are 
fixed in the comparator simulation, it is possible for a base line population to grow faster, 
 11though only temporarily.  If the region has a very young population and it starts out with high 
fertility, its age distribution will change following the fertility decline so that an increased 
proportion survives into the fertile age group.  Thus, even though births per woman decline, 
there is a temporary increase in the number fertile women.  For similar reasons, it is more 
commonly true that base line labour forces show temporarily faster growth than the 
comparator.  So long as a region’s population is young at the outset, even if survival beyond 
15 is not sufficient to outweigh the decline in fertility, the shift in the age distribution alone 
raises the labour force.  This means that the consequences of fertility decline and ageing are 
quite different consequences for young populations in the developing regions than they are for 
the older industrialised regions. 
It turns out that the only region for which the base line population grows faster than 
the comparator is Sub-Saharan Africa, which starts out with the highest fertility rate and the 
youngest population.  As Table 6 shows, however, all base line populations, including that of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, fall below those of the comparator simulation by 2030.  More regions 
have temporarily higher growth in labour forces, as is indicated by Figure 2, including Sub-
Saharan Africa, India, Indonesia, South America and the Middle East and North Africa.  
Interestingly, the labour force of North America also expands temporarily.  Amongst the 
developed regions it has a comparatively young population to begin with, and our 
incorporation of Mexico into North America strengthens this tendency.  Yet, by 2030, only 
Sub-Saharan Africa has a base line labour force that is larger than the comparator.  For some 
regions, the comparator and the base line are not greatly different.  In particular, by the late 
1990s population growth in Japan and Western Europe had already slowed and, in the case of 
Japan, begun to turn down.  For these regions, the base line yields labour force levels that are 
only a few per cent smaller than those of the comparator. 
  While the popular discourse on ageing has focussed on its tendency to slow labour 
force growth and reduce saving in the industrialised world, this comparison shows that the 
opposite occurs in the developing world, at least up to 2020.  Through 2030, at least, as 
average saving rates decline in rich regions they increase in developing regions because 
youthful populations survive into high-saving age groups, as shown in Figure 3.  This, 
combined with the fact that slower population growth causes slower growth in aggregate 
demand and therefore in capital returns and investment demand, results in a smooth slow 
relative decline in regional average real rates of return on installed capital throughout the 
 12world.
22  When we examine the actual volumes of global saving and investment, the relative 
significance of these effects is clarified (also shown in Figure 3).  The dominant influence is 
clearly demand growth, which causes a slowdown in global investment relative to the 
comparator.  This is almost matched by the fall in industrial country savings, the difference 
being made up by a comparatively small addition to savings volume from developing regions.  
Relative to the comparator simulation, then, slower population growth and reduced saving 
rates do not appear to cause any impending crisis in global capital markets.
23
  The pattern of GDP growth across the regions follows the trends in labour force 
growth relative to the comparator, as shown in Figure 4.  Real GNP per capita tends to rise as 
population growth slows, a predisposition identified earlier.  The one exception to this, 
however, is Western Europe, whose slow labour force growth tends to retard investment to 
such an extent that there is a slight decline in real per capita income relative to the comparator 
scenario.  The volumes of output in each sector grow more slowly in the base line with the 
slowdown in production growth largest in food sectors globally.  This is an Engel effect that 
follows from the increased per capita incomes in most regions and the slower population 
growth.  Accordingly, the average global price of food products is lower relative to other 
product prices and this reduces growth in land and natural resource rents. 
The effects on trade are also notable.  In Western Europe and Japan, the slow down of 
population and labour force growth further weakens their manufacture sector.  Western 
Europe’s net imports of industrial products are larger by half, while Japan’s are larger by a 
fifth.  This is by contrast with North America, where the population and labour force actually 
rises slightly in the base line compared to that in the comparator.  This shifts its comparative 
advantage towards labour-intensive industry and turns the region from a net importer of 
manufactured goods to a net exporter.  As more resources are relocated to the industrial 
sector, North America’s food production and exports fall.  And since international food prices 
are lower in the base line, this improves North America’s terms of trade.  These changes 
notwithstanding, the most affected region is China.  Its population and labour force are 
smaller in 2030 by more than a fifth.  With less people to feed, China needs less food imports.  
Meanwhile the reduction in its supply of unskilled labour causes its manufactured sector to be 
                                                      
22 The simulated decline relative to the comparator is a few per cent of the rate, or about 30 basis points. 
23Poterba (2004) has similar findings of the impact of population ageing on the asset market in the United States 
between 2020 and 2050.   In the long run, in most regions, the value of investment tends to fall off as population 
growth slows, maintaining rough capital account balance.  In North America, however, there is a tendency for its 
young and expanding labour force to attract investment even while its aged population is growing and so its 
average saving rate is declining.  The effect of this is for the North American current account deficit to widen.  
This is true to a much more modest extent in Western Europe, Japan and Australia while the savings to support 
this arises out of current account surpluses in East Asia. 
 13smaller.  Because China’s aged tend to continue saving, and per capita income growth 
remains high, its substantial current account surplus is projected to continue.  A numerical 
summary is provided in Table 7. 
  In sum, then, the introduction of ageing in all regions and associated slower 
population growth retards aggregate economic activity and savings, mainly in the 
industrialised regions.  There is, however, a compensating boost in the developing regions 
sufficient to keep the global economy on a steady path, albeit with an increasing flow of 
financial capital from the developing to the industrialised regions and hence a tendency 
toward expanding current account deficits in the latter.  All this structural change 
notwithstanding, real incomes per capita tend to be improved. 
 
5. POLICY RESPONSES TO AGEING 
While the global effects of slower population growth and ageing appear from the 
previous section to be non-destructive, they create challenges for governments.  Since their 
budgets depend on tax bases and these depend, in turn, on GDP, slower GDP growth tends 
not to be favoured by them.  Moreover, increased age dependency raises the fiscal burden in 
regions where health costs and retirement incomes are at least partially tax financed.  These 
fiscal policy consequences are difficult to examine at a global level because the available 
databases, including the one used in this study, do not permit the clear delineation of age-
specific service consumption.  Nonetheless, it is possible to examine the broader economic 
implications of two policies designed to stem the effects of slower population growth and 
ageing, namely increased aged labour force participation (later retiring ages) and migration.  
To explore the possible implications of these for global economic performance, two further 
demographic scenarios are constructed for comparison with the base line.  They are: 
o  Increased aged participation: the governments of Western Europe, Japan, North 
America and Australia increase retirement ages so that aged labour force participation 
is just sufficient to hold non-working aged dependency ratios constant from 2000 
onwards 
o  Replacement migration: Western Europe, North America and Australia permit 
sufficient “replacement” migration to hold non-working aged dependency ratios 
constant from 2000 onwards.
24  This migration is permanent and so it is assumed that 
no migrant income is remitted to countries of origin.
25 
                                                      
24 For each destination region, the composition of migration flows across regions of origin, age and gender is 
held constant, while aggregate flows are inflated by a single factor.  This factor is rendered endogenous by a 
 14For increased aged participation in the advanced economies to be sufficient to hold non-
working aged dependency ratios constant, 60+ participation rates in North America, Western 
Europe and Australia must approach those currently observed in Japan, while the Japanese 
aged male participation rate would need to rise to three quarters by 2030.  The replacement 
migration solution requires still more dramatic change.  Migration rates would be required to 
increase many-fold and, particularly in North America, the resulting population growth would 
be large.  Still more dramatic would be the impacts of this migration on the source regions.  
Some, including Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, would have their working aged 
populations seriously depleted by 2020.  Both these simulations are extreme and politically 
infeasible, yet they offer caricatures of policies under implementation or review, the analysis 
of which sheds light on future economic implications. 
 
a. Increased Aged Participation 
There are no changes in total populations relative to the base line, only more abundant 
labour in Australia, North America, Japan and Western Europe (Table 8).  This raises 
marginal products of physical capital in the affected regions and they therefore attract larger 
shares of global investment, depleting the levels of investment in other regions (Figure 5).  
Again, the largest share of this investment is diverted from China in the long term.  At the 
same time, these changes in the advanced regions confer terms of trade improvements on the 
other regions, which are clear from the rises in their home GDP prices relative to those of the 
advanced regions, as shown in Table 9.  These terms of trade improvements are sufficient to 
ensure that the diversion of investment causes no substantial loss of real per capita income in 
the developing regions.  Growth in the four industrialised regions is spurred by their added 
investment and they enjoy increased per capita incomes (also shown in Table 9).  Of course, 
these increases come at the cost of reduced leisure for the old. 
These real income increases tend to shift demand in favour of more income elastic 
industrial products and services, a shift which is exacerbated by the ageds’ comparatively 
large expenditure shares on services in those regions.  This, combined with the increased 
labour supplies, ensures that industrial and service output expands relative to agricultural 
output, as do industrial exports.  There are no Rybczyinski contractions of other sectors in the 
industrialised regions, however.  Both employment and output volume increase in all sectors.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
closure change that holds the non-working aged dependency ratio exogenous and constant.  For a more general 
set of experiments with migration flows, see Tyers et al. (2006). 
25 Faini (2003) shows that permanent migrants tend not to send remittances to their countries of origin. 
 15In the developing regions the changes are smaller, transmitted through improvements in their 
terms of trade on the one hand and the increased cost of funds for investment on the other.  As 
the supply of labour grows in the advanced regions real GDP and hence aggregate demand 
expands, crowding the fixed factors.  In the affected regions, therefore, both land and natural 
resource rents increase relative to regional GDP prices.  Land and resource rents fall in the 
developing regions but real wages fall in both. 
 
b. Replacement Migration 
Replacement migration requires the relocation of substantial fractions of the 
populations of some regions of origin, most particularly “Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union”, “Other East Asia”, the “Middle East and North Africa” and the “Rest of the 
World”.  Because the scale of this relocation is vast in the long term, this simulation is run to 
2020 only.  Interestingly, the migrations have the effect of raising the average global saving 
rate, by relocating young, high-saving groups from regions where the old also save to regions 
where the old tend not to save, while at the same time raising the real incomes of these 
groups. 
The effect of the migration is to increase the labour forces of the destination regions 
and, since the migrants are generally younger than the destination populations, reduce their 
non-working aged dependency ratios (Figure 6 and Table 10).  Moreover, since the working-
age groups have the highest saving rates and the elderly have negative saving in these regions, 
saving rates in the destination regions rise significantly (also shown in Figure 6) while they 
tend to fall in the main regions of origin.  In the expanding destination regions there is a 
tendency for the real wage to fall (Table 11), reducing the costs of tradeable goods and 
depreciating their real exchange rates.  The latter can be seen from comparisons of the paths 
of GDP prices in Figure 8 and the changes shown in Table 11.  At the same time, this raises 
the marginal products of physical capital in these regions so that they attract greater shares of 
the world’s investment.  Real GDP expands significantly in all the destination regions, 
relative to the base line, for both these reasons, as shown in Figure 7 and Table 11. 
The redirection of investment to the destination regions might at the outset be 
expected to expand their current account deficits, but this tendency is offset by the strong rises 
in their average saving rates and the corresponding falls in those of regions of origin.  The 
new scarcity of labour in the regions of origin raises real wages relative to the base line, 
causing real appreciations (which are, again, discernable from Figure 8). 
 16The tendency for population increases to suppress real per capita income is at least 
partially offset, in the case of immigration, by increased investment.  The scale of the new 
investment in the recipient regions is, nonetheless, insufficient to reverse the tendency, as is 
also shown in Figure 8.  Yet the effects on the real per capita incomes of the destination 
regions are non-uniform, with Western Europe suffering a comparatively modest per capita 
income penalty.  This is because of differences in the effects of the migration on the terms of 
trade.  Note from the GDP price effects that Western Europe experiences a substantial real 
appreciation relative to the other destination regions.  This also indicates an improvement in 
its terms of trade relative to those regions.  It occurs because, compared with North America 
and Australia, Western Europe has greater trade with the regions from which its immigrants 
come.  The flow therefore tends to reduce its import demand and export supply, shifting the 
terms of trade in its favour.  In the other destination regions, trade is most intensive with non-
source regions and their terms of trade are dominated by the effects of their wage reductions 
and hence their real depreciations against all trading partners.  So Western Europe, by 2020, 
attracts a labour force expansion by more than half, its real GDP increases by almost half yet 
its real per capita income falls only by seven per cent.
26  Ignoring environmental and 
congestion externalities, this does suggest substantial benefits for indigenous Europeans. 
  Turning, finally, to the implications for product markets, the destination regions 
experience a surge in aggregate demand as new investment follows their rising labour forces.  
The supply of all products and services increases in these regions.  Correspondingly, supply 
declines relative to the base line in the main regions of origin.  Yet, for the world as a whole 
there is a substantial net increase in output in all three sectors.  This has two sources.  First, 
the average saving rate is higher following the migration, as indicated earlier, so the rate of 
global capital accumulation is greater following the migrations.  Second, there is a 
productivity gain associated with moving workers from poor countries where labour 
productivity is low to rich countries where it is comparatively high.  Of course the latter 
contribution rests on the assumption that immigrants assume the productivity level of 
indigenous workers in the region of destination.
27  In the food and industrial sectors this rise 
in net global output is smaller because of their dependence on the fixed factors land and 
                                                      
26 This compares with the increase of 171 per cent projected for Western Europe over the level of per capita 
income in 1997. 
27 This assumption is borne out in the empirical literature, though there tends to be a lag of up to a decade 
following arrival for its full realisation (personal communication, Professor Tim Hatton, Australian National 
University). 
 17natural resources.  Land and natural resource rents rise substantially in the destination regions 
and fall by smaller proportions in the regions of origin. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
An analysis of demographic change and labour force participation confirms that the 
populations in several key regions, including Western Europe, Central Europe, the Former 
Soviet Union and Japan, are likely to decline in the near future at rates previously 
unanticipated.  Moreover, the population of China will also begin declining in the next decade 
and the labour forces of Western and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, Japan and 
China are all likely to decline sooner and more dramatically.  To analyse the economic effects 
of this, the global demographic analysis is linked to a dynamic model of the global economy 
that has multiple age-gender groups.  A base line projection is constructed for the world 
economy through 2030, incorporating expected future demographic change.  This base line is 
then compared with a constant and uniform population growth scenario.  The comparison 
shows that the ageing of populations and labour forces that accompanies the population 
growth slowdowns will reduce the total volume of saving in the older industrial regions. 
  Yet the fear that this would lead to a tightening in world capital markets, a fall in asset 
values and a slow-down in per capita economic growth is not borne out.  Slower population 
growth does slow the growth of aggregate demand and hence investment by almost as much 
as the ageing process reduces saving in the industrialised regions.  The savings shortfall that 
emerges is then readily met by a rise in saving in the developing and middle-income regions, 
whose populations are now young and so have increasing saving rates as the very young 
survive to working age.  The effect of the slower population growth and the ageing is 
therefore to cause global interest rates to be gently lower than they would otherwise be. 
Another consequence of slower population growth and ageing in the industrialised 
regions is increased aged dependency ratios.  These are likely to induce governments to 
attempt to arrest the declines in their workforces by increasing labour force participation by 
the aged and expanding immigration.  Should governments in the advanced economies seek to 
raise aged participation rates, those economies would be larger as investment is attracted by 
their larger labour forces and so their per capita incomes would increase at the expense of 
aged leisure.  Output would be higher in these advanced regions and fixed factor rents would 
rise there.  Yet the developing regions would also gain from higher participation in the 
advanced regions, via improvements in their terms of trade. 
 18Replacement migration to regions with rising aged dependency would have very 
substantial demographic and economic impacts.  In most recipient regions, real wage rates 
would fall and more investment would be attracted but the resulting acceleration in capital 
accumulation would not be sufficient to offset the tendency for the labour supply increase to 
reduce real per capita income.  Moreover, the expanded population would further “crowd” 
fixed factors, causing land and natural resource rents to rise.  Only in Western Europe would 
the tendency for the increased population to suppress per capita income be substantially offset 
by a combination of the diversion of investment from other regions and an improvement in 
the terms of trade.  Relative to other destination regions, Western Europe has a greater 
proportion of trade with the regions from which its migrants come.  This migration is 
therefore a substitute for trade, reducing Western Europe’s trade dependency so that the 
resulting terms of trade improvement would more than offset the effect of the labour force 
enlargement on costs and the real exchange rate.  Real per capita income in Western Europe 
would therefore be impaired only slightly, though this comparative improvement over the 
performance of the other destination regions would occur at the expense of output and income 
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Figure 2: Base Line Relative to Comparator Populations and Labour 







































Figure 3: Base Line Relative to Comparator Savings and Global Investment 
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Figure 4: Base Line Relative to Comparator GDP and GNP per capita 























































































Figure 6: “Replacement Migration”, Labour Force and Average Saving 



















































Figure 7: “Replacement Migration” Investment and Real GDP, Departure 









































Figure 8: “Replacement Migration” GDP Prices and Real per Capita 
Income, Departure from Base Line, % 
 27Table 1: Regional Composition 
 
Region  Composition of aggregates 
Australia  
North America  Canada, Mexico, United States 
Western Europe  European Union, including Switzerland and Scandinavia but 
excluding the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union 
Central Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland 
Japan  
China  Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan 
Indonesia  
Other East Asia  Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam 
India  
Other South Asia  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka 
South America  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Venezuela, Uruguay 
Middle East and Nth Africa  Includes Morocco through the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Sub-Saharan Africa  The rest of Africa 
Rest of World  Includes the rest of Central America, Indochina, the small 
Island states of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans and 
the Mediterranean Sea, Myanmar and Mongolia, New 






Table 2:  Base Line Projection of Population Levels and Compositions: 
 
  Population, 
millions 
% Female  % 60+ 
  Initial 2030 Initial 2030 Initial  2030 
Australia  19  24  50.2 50.9 16.1  23.9 
North America  403  529 50.8 50.6 13.9  21.6 
Western Europe  421  395 51.2 51.1 21.2  29.1 
Central Europe  388  319 52.3 52.2 16.3  24.8 
Japan  126  115 51.0 51.0 21.9  34.4 
China  1272 1355 48.5  49.1  9.7  21.4 
Indonesia  201 272 50.2  50.2 7.2  14.6 
Other East Asia  282 380 50.2  5.00 7.6  16.9 
India  955 1444 48.2 48.9  6.9  14.2 
Other South Asia  372 664 48.8  48.6 5.7  11.5 
South America  335 489 50.4  50.1 8.0  16.7 
Mid East Nth Africa  331 561 49.1  49.2 6.1  13.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  586 1153 50.4 51.0  4.6  7.0 
Rest of World  215 311 50.0  50.1 8.2  18.0 
Source: Projection using the model described in the text and as presented in more detail by Chan and Tyers 
(2006). 
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Table 3: Base Line Projections of Labour Force Size and Structure 
 
  Labour force
a % Female  % 40+ 
  Initial 2030 Initial 2030 Initial 2030 
Australia  8  10 37 40 42 48 
North America  182  250  40 42 42 47 
Western Europe  184  165  40 44 47 55 
Central Europe  181  148  47 46 44 53 
Japan  61 55 37 37 58 65 
China  570  592  37 36 34 47 
Indonesia  87  130  38 38 40 54 
Other East Asia  127  178  41 40 37 51 
India  356  594  27 28 36 47 
Other South Asia  134  265  28 28 32 44 
South America  123  193  38 39 33 48 
Mid East Nth Africa  103  176  24 23 30 42 
Sub-Saharan Africa  150  349  28 29 29 36 
Rest of World  79  131  36 34 38 48 
a  Measured in full time equivalent workers. 






Table 4: Base Line Non-Working Aged Dependency Ratios 
 
Regions Non-working  aged/working 
 Initial  2030 
Australia  0.35 0.54 
North America  0.24 0.36 
Western Europe  0.42 0.61 
Central Europe  0.29 0.42 
Japan  0.32 0.48 
China  0.19 0.44 
Indonesia  0.09 0.16 
Other East Asia  0.09 0.23 
India  0.12 0.23 
Other South Asia  0.09 0.18 
South America  0.16 0.29 
Mid East Nth Africa  0.15 0.33 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.13 0.15 
Rest of World  0.15 0.27 
Source: Base period statistics constructed from population statistics from United Nations (2003) and simulation 
results from the demographic model described in the text. 
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Table 5: Base Line Real Per Capita Income Projection to 2030 
(Ranked by performance) 
 
  % change over 1997  Implied annual 
average growth rate, 
% per year 
India  369  4.8 
China  361  4.7 
Indonesia  350  4.7 
Other East Asia  341  4.6 
Central Europe FSU  218  3.6 
Japan  207  3.5 
Australia  185  3.2 
Western Europe  171  3.1 
Other South Asia  156  2.9 
South America  142  2.7 
Rest of World  141  2.7 
North America  139  2.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  125  2.5 
Mid-East Nth Africa  88  1.9 




Table 6: The Comparator and Base Line Demographic Projections
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Australia  0.90 26  24  -6.4 
North America  1.02 564  529  -6.2 
Western Europe  0.08 433  395  -8.8 
Central Europe  -0.31 350  319  -8.9 
Japan  -0.05 124  115  -7.5 
China  0.89 1704 1355  -20.5 
Indonesia  1.59 338  271  -19.8 
Other East Asia  1.49 459  380  -17.1 
India  1.75 1694 1445  -14.7 
Other South Asia  2.09 736  665  -9.7 
South America  1.61 568  489  -13.9 
Mid East Nth Afr  1.94 625  562  -10.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.14 1180 1153  -2.3 
Rest of World  1.77 384  311  -19.1 
Total, world  1.27 9184 8012  -12.8 
a The comparator projection has annual growth rates constant for each region at the 1997-8 rate.  There are no 
changes in age-gender distribution and labour forces grow at the same rate as populations.  This projection is a 
contrivance to demonstrate the effects of ageing and slower growth in the base line projection. 
Source: The comparator projection is as described in the text and the base line results are more fully documented 






































Australia  -7.5                      -6.1 -6.2 -5.3 -1.1 0.4  0.9 -15.7 -4.2 -8.6 -3.4 -5.3
North America  -1.6                  
                 
                       
                       
                   
                       
                 
             
                 
                       
                       
                 
                       
-16.5 -0.8  -0.3  -2.5 2.9 -0.4 -5.3 0.5 -1.6 3.2 -0.9
Western Europe  -12.5 -9.6 -11.2  -9.7  0.7 -0.5 3.2  -21.5 -9.3 -14.3 -11.8 -9.2
Central Eur, FSU  -9.6 0.4 -5.2 -6.3 -0.1 3.2 3.7 -14.6 -5.4 -8.6 -5.9 -6.3
Japan  -9.4 -6.6 -1.1 -6.2 2.3 0.4 6.2 -19.0 -6.7 -13.3 -10.2 -5.4
China  -22.4 5.6 -17.2  -16.5  1.1 8.4 9.4 -26.6 -13.3 -16.1 -17.1 -16.4
Indonesia  -11.8 6.8 -8.7 -5.9 0.2 21.8 9.4 -14.9 -5.4 -8.0 -6.5 -5.0
Other East Asia  -13.8 6.2 -10.4  -9.0  0.5  15.1 8.0 -16.7
 
-7.9 -8.9 -10.0 -8.4
India  -5.8 7.1 -1.0  -0.9  -0.9  18.0 4.4 -9.0 -0.2 -3.8 -0.3 -0.4
Other South Asia  0.1 2.5 1.1  2.0  -2.2  12.5 0.1 -3.4 3.0 -0.7 5.8 2.0
South America  -7.4 5.1 -7.7 -4.6 -0.5 12.6 3.5 -11.5 -4.3 -6.2 -4.8 -4.2
Mid East Nth Africa  -9.2 11.0 -6.8 -5.4 0.1 7.2 4.4 -12.4 -4.5 -8.2 -4.4 -5.7
SubSaharan Africa  15.5 9.6 16.0  15.1  -4.2  15.0 -4.7 13.3 13.7 10.0 19.9 14.6
Rest of World  -6.3 5.7 -6.5 -1.3 -1.5 22.9 4.2 -14.3 -1.2 -7.5 -0.2 -0.9
a The GDP price is measured relative to the common numeraire in GTAP-Dynamic.  Note relative values only, indicative of real exchange rate changes. 
b All domestic factor and product prices are measured relative to regional GDP prices. 
Source:  Simulations of the model described in the text. 32
 
 
Table 8: Effects in 2030 of “Increased Aged Participation” (to Retain Fixed 
Aged Dependency), Compared with Base Line Scenario 
 




  Total 60+  Aged  NW 
      
Australia  13.0 248.3  -32.8 
North America  9.1 98.9  -31.3 
Western Europe  12.3 141.7  -29.0 
Japan  10.8 43.2  -30.2 
    Source: Simulation results from the model described in the text. 











































Australia  13.0                      0.4 11.2 9.9 -1.9  8.8 -1.2 13.7 10.2 7.6 11.0 10.0
North America  9.1                      
                       
                      
                      
                       
                      
                      
                       
                       
                      
                      
                      
                      
1.8 8.4 7.9 -1.3 7.3 0.7 8.2 8.1 4.2 9.2 7.8
Western Europe  12.3 0.6 11.5 9.6 -1.2 8.5 -0.9 12.3 9.4 7.5 11.4 9.4
Central Eur, FSU  0.0 1.9 -2.9 -1.7 0.9 0.0 -1.4 -3.3 -2.8 -1.5 -3.0 -1.3
Japan  10.8 -1.3 7.6 7.9 -0.7 7.6 -1.3 7.2 6.8 4.3 7.9 8.0
China  0.0 0.7 -6.5 -3.0 0.6 -0.1 -2.5 -2.6 -3.0 -0.5 -3.4 -3.3
Indonesia  0.0 0.3 -1.6 -1.4 0.9 0.4 -1.1 -2.4 -2.3 -0.9 -2.8 -0.8
Other East Asia  0.0 0.2 -2.3 -1.6 1.2 1.2 -1.2 -3.2 -2.9 -1.2 -3.6 -0.8
India  0.0 0.5 -1.9 -1.3 1.0 -0.1 -1.2 -2.5 -2.0 -0.7 -2.6 -1.2
Other South Asia  0.0 1.4 -2.4 -1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.9 -2.2 -1.6 -0.7 -2.2 -1.1
South America  0.0 1.0 -2.2 -1.2 0.9 0.3 -1.1 -3.5 -1.8 -1.9 -2.1 -0.7
Mid East Nth Africa  0.0 1.1 -1.8 -1.0 0.9 0.7 -1.0 -3.6 -2.2 -2.0 -2.4 -0.5
SubSaharan Africa  0.0 1.3 -1.2 -0.6 0.4 0.3 -0.6 -1.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.3 -0.2
Rest of World  0.0 1.0 -1.4 -1.0 0.9 0.3 -0.9 -2.8 -1.8 -1.3 -2.2 -0.5
a The GDP price is measured relative to the common numeraire in GTAP-Dynamic.  Note relative values only, indicative of real exchange rate changes. 
b All domestic factor and product prices are measured relative to regional GDP prices.  Capital goods prices are omitted.  Where these rise substantially, all three product 
prices can fall relative to the GDP price. 
Source:  Simulations of the model described in the text.  34
 
 
Table 10: Effects in 2020 of “Replacement Migration” (to Retain Fixed 
Aged Dependency), Compared with Base Line Scenario
a 
 




 Total  60+  Total  60+  Aged  NW 
Australia  87.1 41.7  90.6  42.1  -25.7 
North America  113.7 65.0  121.8  63.9  -25.5 
Western Europe  46.8 18.9  52.9  19.0  -22.2 
Central Europe  -42.1 -20.0  -45.8  -20.4  47.9 
Japan  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
China  -5.3 -3.3  -5.5  -3.0  2.4 
Indonesia  -0.3 -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  0.1 
Other East Asia  -22.7 -16.7  -23.3  -16.4  8.4 
India  -4.6 -3.6  -4.6  -3.4  0.9 
Other South Asia  -9.1 -8.2  -9.3  -7.6  0.8 
South America  -8.6 -5.5  -9.0  -5.8  4.0 
Mid East Nth Africa  -12.8 -10.1  -12.6  -9.5  2.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -6.2 -7.0  -6.5  -6.7  -0.6 
Rest of World  -78.2 -55.8  -80.7  -54.1  124.0 
a  The projections under the replacement migration scenario run only to 2020 since, beyond that, the 
migrations more than deplete some age groups in source regions. 
Source: Simulation results from the model described in the text  
 








































Australia  90.6                        11.3 86.4 62.8 -4.3 -16.1 -12.7 113.1 60.6 52.8 66.5 63.0
North America  121.8                     
                       
                     
                     
                    
                       
                       
                    
                    
                    
                     
                       
                       
21.4 160.8  100.8 -5.9 -12.7 -8.8 183.7 102.6 77.3 123.3 97.0
Western Europe  52.8 16.5 45.8 36.4 1.8 -7.3 -8.7 80.8 31.7 43.9 40.4 35.4
Central Europe,FSU  -45.8 0.9 -80.8 -43.9
 
  17.1 22.0 5.5 -62.6 -47.2 -41.9 -49.7 -41.8
Japan  0.0 3.1 -33.8 -9.2 16.1 6.9 -6.7 -26.1 -22.3 -16.4 -25.3 -6.4
China  -5.5 1.8 -39.4  -14.8 6.9 5.2 -7.6 -12.8 -13.5 -4.3 -15.6 -16.8
Indonesia  -0.2 1.3 -19.0 -7.3 7.8 0.7 -5.4 -8.4 -9.7 -3.1 -11.5 -5.7
Other East Asia  -23.3 -1.5 -42.5 -24.2 14.9 19.5 1.0 -33.4 -29.1 -16.8 -33.9 -20.2
India  -4.6 2.0 -23.9  -10.1 9.2 1.3 -4.5 -12.8 -12.9 -4.3 -15.9 -10.1
Other South Asia  -9.3 5.0 -28.3  -11.8 9.2 3.6 -1.2 -16.5 -13.9 -6.8 -17.6 -12.0
South America  -9.0 4.8 -30.1  -12.6 9.4 3.9 -3.4 -21.0 -14.7 -12.2 -17.0 -11.2
Mid East Nth Africa  -12.6 4.8 -34.1 -15.1  11.0 9.9 -2.7 -30.9 -20.2 -19.6 -21.3 -12.6
Sub-Saharan Africa  -6.5 7.6 -22.6 -8.8 8.2 2.6 -2.0 -15.5 -11.1 -9.1 -12.6 -7.2
Rest of World  -80.7 -33.9 -97.1 -65.8 38.2 117.8 65.4 -89.4 -70.1 -72.6 -74.2 -61.3
a This simulation extends only to 2020.  Thereafter, migration more than depletes some regional age-gender groups. 
b The GDP price is measured relative to the common numeraire in GTAP-Dynamic.  Note relative values only, indicative of real exchange rate changes. 
c All domestic factor and product prices are measured relative to regional GDP prices.  Capital goods prices are omitted.  Where these rise substantially, all three 
product prices can fall relative to the GDP price. 
Source:  Simulations of the model described in the text. 
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